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Abstract. In this paper the meaning of “under invoicing in a real estate market” signifies that the market value of real prop-
erty exceeds its record value appearing in government documentation. The purpose of this study is to identify the level 
of under invoicing and determine the factors that affect the under invoicing in real estate markets in Pakistan. We apply 
OLS and Extreme Bounds Analysis techniques to test our propositions. The statistical sample consists of 338 real estate 
contracts. We find that under invoicing is determined by a multiplicity of factor. These include: the capital gains tax rate, 
the measurable amount of corruption in the economy, the risk-free rate, a buyer’s profession, the reputation of the local 
housing authority, and the degree of disequilibria in regional real estate markets. Our findings are consistent with four dis-
tinct hypotheses: (a) tax evasion hypothesis, (b) widening gap hypothesis, (c) a corruption hypothesis and (d) a signaling 
hypothesis. The evidence suggests that higher rates of taxation and a larger statistical incidence of corruption in markets 
tend to be associated with a greater probability of under-invoicing. The findings of the study have practical implications for 
those investors who are interested in real estate markets of emerging and developing economies.
Keywords: under-invoicing, real estate market, tax evasion, black money, widening gap, extreme bounds analysis.
Introduction
Housing markets in developing countries have been found 
to be relatively dynamic because of volatile returns and 
extraordinarily high liquidity. Over the past two decades, 
several countries experienced high returns and high li-
quidity in real estate relative to capital markets (Bian et al., 
2019; Brounen et  al., 2019; Liu et  al., 2019). In general, 
one can observe a rapid escalation in the prices of some 
kinds of real estate over time. In a dichotomized market 
for real estate, the prices of similar properties vary from 
each other because of administrative inefficiencies reflect-
ing haphazard record keeping by local governmental bod-
ies (Andrew & Meen, 2003; Waltl, 2019). Pervasive dif-
ferences between prices of comparable properties are an-
other factor contributing to differences in invoicing. The 
difference between the market value of a property and its 
recorded value has been called under invoicing (Patnaik 
et al., 2012). In this paper we address the observable fac-
tors systematically associated with under invoicing.
The explanatory hypotheses we address include: (1) 
systematic tax evasion, (2) the persistence of a widening 
gap between assessed value and market value, (3) endemic 
corruption, (4) a signaling hypothesis, (5) the reputation 
of the local housing authority and (6) market sentiment. 
These hypotheses have been discussed in the literature of 
international trade, export and import businesses (e.g. 
Beja, 2008; Patnaik et al., 2012). The different theories at-
tempt to explain the factors that cause under invoicing 
and many are supported by empirical evidence in import 
and export businesses.
An unresolved question is why under invoicing is a 
common occurrence in the real estate market in Pakistan. 
There are several theoretical as well as practical reasons 
as to why the incidence of under invoicing is of interest. 
Sandmo (2005) found a general trend among traders to re-
port the lower value of assets or property on invoices rela-
tive to its market value. He suggested that this tendency 
was a manifestation of tax evasion strategy. In this study, 
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we test the role of the tax evasion hypothesis to explain 
under invoicing in a real estate market. This hypothesis 
allows us to develop a theory to explain how varying tax 
rates may induce under in voicing in real estate markets.
A second testable theory analyses the explanatory 
power of the huge gap between government’s prescribed 
rates of assessment and the market value of properties. 
This paper explores the causal link between the widening 
gap hypothesis and the incidence of under invoicing. Pre-
vious literature (Ahmed Qureshi & Mahmood, 2016; Beja, 
2008; Patnaik et al., 2012) explored the theory that higher 
levels of corruption (sometimes referred to as “black mon-
ey”) in an economy tends to be associated with increases 
in the incidence of under invoicing. In this study, we ex-
plore the nexus between the statistical incidence of under 
invoicing and black money.
Some researchers have theorized that the effect of posi-
tive market sentiments is to push up the general level of 
prices in the market. For example, recent studies (Hui & 
Wang, 2014; Wang & Hui, 2017), found that market sen-
timents and investors’ sentiments were significantly posi-
tively correlated with the variation of housing prices. In 
this paper, we analyze two issues: (a) We examine how 
the variability of market sentiments influences the trans-
action prices of real properties and (b) We address the 
question of whether the variations in those sentiments 
are systematically related to under invoicing in real es-
tate. Infrastructure development has been shown to affect 
the dynamic equilibria of the residential housing market 
(Hromada, 2015). In this study we explore the question 
of whether sector development in the real estate market is 
systematically associated under invoicing in that market.
The reputation of the local housing authority is consid-
ered an important determinant of the value of real proper-
ties in Pakistan. Previous studies found that a housing au-
thority’s prestige is an important factor in pricing of prop-
erties (Abidin et  al., 2012; Hutchison & Disberry, 2015; 
Pugh, 2001). This paper includes among the explanatory 
variables the reputation of the local housing authority. The 
effect of market signaling on the level of prices is its im-
pact, if any, on the incidence of under invoicing in the real 
estate market. The analyses carried out in this paper are 
conducted in stages. In the first stage we identify possible 
theoretical explanations of under-invoicing. In the sec-
ond stage we identify the possible factors that affect pric-
ing level using Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) (Leamer, 
1983, 1985). In addition, we conduct sensitivity analysis 




According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI), “mis-in-
voicing” consists of fraudulently manipulating the value 
of assets and/or property on an invoice as to misrepresent 
its market value when documentation of a transaction is 
submitted to a tax authority. The differences between the 
market value of a property and its recorded value has been 
called under invoicing (Patnaik et  al., 2012). Previously 
published studies reported under-invoicing in different 
countries e.g. Pakistan (Ahmed Qureshi & Mahmood, 
2016), China (Beja, 2008), and other developing coun-
tries (Cassara, 2016; Musliu et  al., 2015; Woodward & 
Tan, 2015). It is generally thought that real estate markets 
of developing countries, especially in Pakistan, experience 
pervasive under-invoicing. The pervasiveness of under 
invoicing in real estate markets in developing countries 
raises numerous questions regarding the economic (and 
other) explanations for under-invoicing in those markets. 
The explanatory hypotheses proposed include: (1) system-
atic tax evasion, (2) persistence of a widening gap between 
assessed value and market value, (3) endemic corruption, 
(4) a signaling hypothesis, (5) the reputation of housing 
authority and (6) market sentiment.
Sandmo (2005) found a general trend among traders 
to report lower values of assets or property on invoices 
relative to their transaction values. He suggested that this 
tendency was a manifestation of tax evasion strategy. Dur-
ing contract negotiations, both parties agree to report a 
specious small transaction price for the purchased prop-
erty on the sales deed in order to evade the real estate 
transaction tax. Earlier studies used various proxies relat-
ing to tax evasion. These included: covering Capital Gains 
Tax (CGT), Capital Value Tax (CVT), Stamp Duty and 
Withholding Tax or Advance Tax in real estate (Blackburn 
et al., 2012). Tax evasion theory associates the incidence 
of tax evasion with the informal/undocumented economy 
(Sandmo, 2005). An economy in which real estate sales 
transactions are not documented scrupulously provides 
fertile ground, almost an invitation, for systematic under-
invoicing. For example, the undocumented economy in 
Pakistan, where under-invoicing in real estate transactions 
is common, accounts for between forty to fifty percent of 
the entire economy (Gulzar et al., 2010). Sharply progres-
sive real estate tax rates provide a clear incentive for the 
parties to engage in the practice of under invoicing, there-
by mitigating and evading tax liability.
A different (but not inconsistent) explanatory hypoth-
esis relates to the changes in the difference between the 
assessments of assets and property established by govern-
ment authorities and market transaction prices of those 
assets. We refer to that difference as the “widening gap”. 
This gap produces undocumented cash flows circulating 
in the real estate market, which provides the means as well 
as the incentive for under invoicing in that market. In a 
developing economy such as Pakistan, the market value 
of assets and properties are not determined by tax depart-
ments and municipal authorities (Low et al., 2016; Rymar-
zak & Siemińska, 2012). In Pakistan, most transactions 
in the real estate are based on so-called “DC rates”, es-
tablished by government authorities. However, the actual 
transaction prices are recorded as per the market value. As 
a result of this discrepancy, unrecorded cash flows pervade 
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the real estate market. The divergence between the DC 
rate and the market values can be used as a proxy variable 
to explain under-invoicing.
According to the Federal Board of Revenue Paki-
stan (2019), existing prices of real property in the Is-
lamabad range from 15.000 rupees to 93.000 rupees per 
yd2 (0.836 m2). In Rawalpindi the range is from 5.000 ru-
pees to 73.000 rupees per yd2 (0.836 m2). A question we 
will explore is whether common characteristics in such 
diverse housing markets are valued differently by real es-
tate investors in those two cities.
Previously published research focused on the endemic 
corruption hypothesis as a factor responsible for under in-
voicing in the real estate market. The percentage increase 
in corruption has been found to be directly associated 
with the level of under invoicing in the economy (Anson 
et al., 2015; Patnaik et al., 2012). Moreover, the relation-
ship is manifested as a positive correlation (Patnaik et al., 
2012). Statistical data indicating changes in the level and 
magnitude of corruption appear in reports of different 
agencies such as Transparency’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), appearing in the World Economic Forum’s 
assessment. We also use Transparency International and 
Amnesty International Report as proxy for the level of 
corruption and black money in the market.
Other studies documented the role of real estate mar-
ket factors in the under invoicing of assets and proper-
ties (Ling et al., 2019; Rymarzak & Siemińska, 2012). The 
signaling hypothesis is one of the most debated theories; 
it suggests that variation of asset prices and properties are 
related to different market signals and market dynamics. 
Studies of initial public offerings in stock markets identi-
fied the signaling hypothesis as factor responsible for un-
derpricing such as (Alim & Ramakrishnan, 2017; Cheng 
& McMillan, 2015). In this study the signaling hypothesis 
is considered a possible explanatory factor for under in-
voicing.
The risk-free return on investment may also help to 
explain the incidence of under invoicing. The economic 
theory of causality can be explained this way: If the risk-
free rate of return increases, ceteris paribus, the rate of 
savings will likewise increase. To the extent that savings 
increases, again ceteris paribus, one would expect to ob-
serve an increase in business investment activity, includ-
ing activity in the real estate market as well as increase in 
business activities in the aggregate economy (Ascherl & 
Schaefers, 2018; Brobert, 2016). Infrastructure and sector 
development and increasing residential construction both 
affect the dynamic equilibrium of the residential housing 
market (Hromada, 2015). That kind of development tone 
would expect to cause increases in housing prices, which 
may be systematically related to under invoicing in the 
market.
Market sentiments and investor sentiments are also 
included in signaling theory. Previous studies carried out 
in capital and financial markets suggested that market sen-
timent plays a significant role in causing price volatility 
(Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2018; Rathnayake et al., 2019). 
One can bifurcate the sentiment variable: i.e., an opti-
mistic sentiment of future market movements will tend 
to push up the general level of prices (called a “hot mar-
ket”) and pessimistic view of the future market will tend 
to depress the general level of prices (a “cold market”). 
The reputation of the housing authority is considered an 
important determinant of under invoicing of real proper-
ties. Previous studies related to financial markets (Arora & 
Singh, 2019; Chen et al., 2013; Jeribi, 2015), especially ini-
tial public offerings (IPOs), considered the underwriter’s 
prestige as important factor in pricing of IPOs.
Generally, it is thought that a small difference be-
tween market value of properties and value appearing on 
invoices is an indicator of the prestige of the housing au-
thority. Statistical evidence supporting the theory should 
show a negative correlation between the magnitude and 
he incidence of under invoicing and the prestige of the 
local housing authority. The employment status of buyer 
and seller may be significantly associated with transac-
tion prices as well as under invoicing in the Pakistani real 
estate markets. Most employed persons are tax payers in 
Pakistan because their taxes are deducted by the employer. 
In order to get tax rebates, tax payers file tax returns every 
year. As a result, they have tax incentives to report record-
ed prices lower than transaction prices on their properties 
to get the benefits of tax rebates.
This paper incorporates the theories outlined above to 
test the fundamental question: What are significant ex-
planatory variables systematically related to under invoic-
ing in the real estate market of Pakistan.
1.2. The real estate market and its temporal changes 
in Pakistan
According to the 2017 Census of Pakistan, the population 
of Pakistan was more than 207 million. It has been grow-
ing by an average 2.40% per annum. Pakistan has mul-
ticultural and multilingual ethnic societies. It hosts one 
of the largest Afghan refugee populations in the world. 
The age distribution of Pakistan’s population is relatively 
young; more than 60% of the population is between the 
ages of 4 years and 30 years and that proportion has been 
steadily increasing.
Lack of basic facilities in villages and the industriali-
zation in rural areas have led to rapid urbanization and 
the emergence of megacities (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 
2017a, 2017b). As a consequence of those trends, Pakistan 
has become the second-most urbanized nation in South 
Asia, with urban residents constituting about 35% of its 
population as shown Table 1.
As per the 2017 Census of Pakistan and the Pakistan 
Bureau of Statistics, there are two megacities i.e., Karachi 
and Lahore with 15 million and 11 million population, 
respectively. The same sources record 99 cities having a 
population of 100,000 or more. Of those 99 cities, 58 cities 
are located in country’s most populous province Punjab, 
22 cities in Sindh, 11 cities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, five 
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cities in Balochistan, two cities in Azad Kashmir and one 
city in Islamabad Capital Territory (Pakistan Bureau of 
Statistics, 2017b).
Increases in population and growing urbanization have 
led to rapid increases in residential real estate in urban cent-
ers. The growth is observable in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpin-
di, Faisalabad, Islamabad, and Multan. The most prestigious 
housing societies and authorities are the Defense Housing 
Authority (DHA), Bahria town, Capital Smart City, Blue 
World City and Multi-Gardens (Hasan, 2010). The market 
values of properties in the large cities are increasing rapidly 
as shown in Table 2. A government policy intended to pro-
mote real estate activity imposed a decrease in interest rates 
on mortgage loans in 2012. As a consequence, the real es-
tate market of Pakistan has become Asia’s largest real estate 
market; it is experiencing an average annual growth rate 
of approximately 9%. Nationwide house prices, in nominal 
terms, rose by 5.05% to PKR 117058 (US$ 829) per m2 as 
also shown in Table 2.
1.3. Market competitiveness and transaction 
transparency in Pakistan
Pakistan spends an annual amount of approximately $5.2 
billion in its housing market. That constitutes about 2% of 
its GDP. According to the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), 
published industry surveys estimate that the residential 
real estate industry has a current value of about $700 
billion. Real estate and construction, together, account 
for approximately two percent of Pakistan’s total GDP 
(Choudhry et al., 2017).
A unique aspect of Pakistan’s real estate market is that 
the industry recorded its maximum volatility during the 
period from 2010 to 2020, as shown in Table 3. Elsewhere 
in the world (excluding the 2005 sub-prime mortgage cri-
sis), the real estate industry tends to show a steady annual 
growth rate in the neighborhood of five to eight percent. 
In Pakistan, however, monthly growth rates of more than 
10% are routinely recorded.
Pakistani domestic markets show evidence of increas-
ing corruption. Pakistan also ranks low in Global Com-
petitiveness Index in 2020 and constantly decreasing since 
2017, as shown in Table 4. Since 2018, Pakistan has been 
ranked the world’s lowest in ease of doing business. Many 
of the industries in Pakistan have been become techno-
logically obsolete and the development of new businesses 
is trending downward.
The economic factors described above have not had an 
adverse effect on Pakistan’s real estate market. That market 
has been steadily increasing for ten years. According to a 
World Bank estimate, the average size of a country’s real 
Table 1. Growth in demand for residential properties due to urbanization and growth in population  
(source: The World Bank, 2019b)




(% population) Population density
2000 142,343,578 2.83% 32.982 67.018 184.651
2005 160,304,008 2.41% 33.997 66.018 207.949
2010 179,424,641 2.28% 36.234 65.003 232.753
2015 199,426,964 2.14% 36.026 63.093 275.289
2016 203,631,353 2.11% 35.819 63.334 269.687
2017 207,906,209 2.10% 35.613 63.558 264.149
2018 212,228,286 2.08% 35.408 63.766 258.7
2019 216,565,318 2.04% 35.202 63.974 260.55
2020 220,892,340 2.00% 34.997 63.203 262.412
Table 2. Market prices of residential property in Pakistan (source: Zameen, 2019)
Year Price per m
2 in 
Islamabad
Price per m2 in 
Rawalpindi
Price per m2 in 
Faisalabad
Price per m2 in 
Karachi
Price per m2 in 
Lahore
Price per m2 in 
Multan
2011 21743 23885 16609 47738 23595 46554
2012 24456 28105 17793 62409 28772 47964
2013 36005 38330 18514 87198 40214 53960
2014 38782 41194 18751 96821 45467 57286
2015 39191 41194 22561 113527 50407 61796
2016 42787 41312 23864 127660 55897 62388
2017 40645 42485 22873 139802 56683 65369
2018 42453 36737 26070 136282 59923 67113
2019 45951 48890 26802 130469 61613 73840
2020 48534 51258 31743 133569 64788 79179
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estate assets constitutes between 60 and 70% of the coun-
try’s total wealth; if these estimates are applied to Pakistan, 
the estimated size of the real estate sector would be $300 
to $400 billion (Tufail & Batool, 2013). The transactions 
in the real estate market have been carried out by an in-
creasing number of uneducated agents and dealers who 
do not have the necessary IT and finance related skills to 
serve their clientele. The statistical incidence of fraud is 
significant. At present, the market has contracted because 
of restrictions on non-filers and the imposition of larger 
taxes on real estate transactions.
The combination of mis-management and extremely 
liquid real estate markets in Pakistan provide incentives as 
well as opportunities for under invoicing As a consequence, 
under invoicing has become a common occurrence in every 
real property market in Pakistan and the volume of trade 
mis-invoicing has exceed US $92.7 billion during last two 
decades (Ahmed Qureshi & Mahmood, 2016). It is reported 
that transactions in real estate markets have been recorded 
at 70 to 80 percent lower value than actual market values 
in Pakistan (Haque, 2015). In consequence, Pakistan has 
been declared as low indexed country at 73 ranks out of 100 
ranks with 3.88 points in Global Real Estate Transparency 
Index, 2020 (JLL and LaSalle, 2020).
2. Methodology
2.1. Data and sample
The sample consisted of 338 executed contracts during the 
period 2010–2018 in real estate market of Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi. The sources include property dealers, hous-
ing authorities, and other real property recording systems 
situated in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In order to match 
the value of property stated on invoices and the transac-
tion market value of the property, we use sale agreement 
of the property and market value from property dealers 
and housing authorities working in those specific areas. 
They were verified through various open access sources 
such Zameen.com which is widely used by investor to find 
the value of real estate properties.
Table 3. Industrial sector disaggregation in the GDP of Pakistan (source: State Bank of Pakistan [SBP], n.d.  
All mounts are in PKRs (million))












2010 1718014 1198896 274674 614460 569191 832901
2011 1746511 1254126 279171 639003 632130 886204
2012 1808124 1304697 302392 664542 703717 932776
2013 1894410 1355570 315428 691093 723823 990839
2014 1943612 1424255 335448 718674 758746 1050844
2015 2035509 1493830 356981 747343 832505 1122032
2016 2187751 1557639 396669 777140 882015 1213253
2017 2331415 1587297 426012 808172 986125 1320737
2018 2357094 1660857 447286 840494 1037147 1396958
2019 2276458 1542461 450820 874283 1077842 1472202
Table 4. Transparency and competitiveness in Pakistan (source: (a) Corruption Perceptions Rank and Corruption Perceptions Index 
from Transparency International, n.d.; (b) Global Competitiveness Rank and Global Competitiveness Index from World Economic 
Forum, 2019; (c) Ease of Doing Business from the World Bank, 2019a)









Ease of Doing 
Business
2010 143 23 101 3.58 96
2011 134 25 123 3.48 105
2012 139 27 118 3.57 106
2013 127 28 124 3.51 110
2014 126 29 133 3.41 136
2015 117 30 129 3.41 148
2016 116 32 126 3.45 144
2017 117 32 106 49.71 147
2018 117 33 107 51.08 136
2019 120 32 110 51.36 108
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The data related to taxes have been collected from the 
different tax files of the Federal Board of Revenue. The 
statistical data on the net volume of corruption is based on 
the Transparency’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
World Economic Forum’s assessment, Transparency In-
ternational and Amnesty International Report issued. 
Changes in the magnitude of corruption are measured by 
the quarterly percentage changes in net volume of corrup-
tion in Pakistan. Statistical data about the risk-free rate of 
return has been transcribed from reports of the State Bank 
of Pakistan. For the dummy variable defined as “buyer’s 
employment status”, we extracted data from the sales con-
tracts between the parties.
2.2. Econometric equations
To determine the statistical incidence of under invoicing 
in real estate market, we use the following definition of 
under-invoicing:
( )Mkt Price – Invoice Price







Under invoicing is defined as the percentage difference 
between market value (measured by the transaction price) 
and the legally documented price of any property record-
ed by the housing authority. To examine the factors that 
are systematically related to under invoicing of property, 
we develop the following model:
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CVT is a capital value tax which is a percentage lev-
ied at total invoiced value of property. Stamp Duty is the 
percentage of tax paid on legal documentation of assets or 
properties. Corruption is measured through quarterly per-
centage change in net volume of corruption in Pakistan. 
WHT is withholding tax which is to be paid at the time 
of property deal by buyer and seller of property. CGT is 
capital gain tax which is paid by seller when seller makes 
profits on selling property. RRF is return on risk free in-
vestment, if it is higher than prices of properties will de-
crease. One would expect the frequency of under invoic-
ing to decrease. Buyer’s employment status is defined as a 
dummy variable: if the buyer is employed it is assigned a 
numerical value of 1, otherwise, 0. Rep. HS is reputation 
of housing society. It is a dummy variable: a high reputa-
tion is assigned a value of 1 and zero otherwise. We cal-
culate reputation housing societies by following formula:
,  
0








. This study considers 
the portion of each society in the total business done 
during the sample period in real estate. ,  i jTRM = total 










total real estate market volume in Islamabad. We also cal-
culate the median for the participation of all societies as:
( ) j jMedian Median TRM= . If society has a value above 
the median, it is assigned as 1 (i.e. high reputation so-
ciety), and 0 otherwise. Sec. Dev is number of develop-
ment projects and facilities available in specific sector or 
area. Transfer Fee is the amount which is paid at the time 
of transfer of assets or property. Widening Gap is differ-
ence between rates defined by local government as official 
rates of properties and market prices of properties in spe-
cific area or sector. Mkt Sent is market sentiment during 
the time of sale and purchase of specific property and is 
characterized as 1 for hot and 0 for cold. If the trading 
magnitude of trading of property is higher than an aver-
age volume is assigned as 1 or otherwise, 0. The symbol 
u represents a stationary random variable distributed as 
( )0,1 N .
2.3. Econometric methods
According to Cooley and LeRoy (1981) economic the-
ory does not indicate which of the variables are robust 
and which should be kept constant while employing any 
statistical technique or model. In order to address this 
difficulty, Leamer (1983, 1985) developed the Extreme 
Bound Analysis (EBA). Levine and Renelt (1992) applied 
that technique. Various parallel models have been de-
veloped and used, but the reliability of these models has 
been called into question. The EBA technique is a reliable 
method; it can be applied to test the sensitivity of statisti-
cal inferences to specification changes. It also reduces the 
uncertainty associated with model fitness and reliability 
(Leamer, 1985).
In this study, we examine the robust predictors that 
influence under invoicing in the real estate market. To 
determine robust predictors, Moosa and Cardak (2006) 
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We estimate the coefficient of variable of interest “Q”. 
The coefficient of that variable is an indicator of sensitiv-
ity and robustness. The methodology of the EBA requires 
many regressions to estimate the value of the coefficient 
of independent variable. The same variables (s) X are in-
cluded in every set of regressions. The variable of interest 
Q and the set of variables Z are chosen from a predeter-
mined pool.
To get a more precise specification of the model and 
improve robustness of variables, we use LASSO regression 
which is widely used to select both variables and meas-
ure the accuracy of model. The acronym LASSO signifies 
Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator. LASSO 
regression is a type of liner regression that uses Shrink-
age. Shrinkage is where data values are shrunk towards 
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a central point, like the mean. The LASSO procedure en-
courages simple, sparse models, i.e., models with fewer es-
timable parameters. This kind of econometric application 
is well-suited for models showing high levels of multicol-
linearity. The technique was first introduced by (Santosa & 
Symes, 1986) and used by (Tibshirani, 1996). The LASSO 
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 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ . (5)
The nature of L1 regularization penalty causes some 
coefficients to shrink to zero. Here the tuning factor λ 
controls the strength of the penalty. If λ = 0, coefficients 
are considered as simple linear regression. If λ = ∞, all co-
efficients are zero. The range 0 < λ < ∞, the coefficients are 
estimated to assume values between 0 and those generated 
by a simple linear regression. When λ is between the ex-
tremes, we are balancing the two ideas. The Lasso regres-
sion can perform variable selection in the linear model. 
As the value of λ increases, more coefficients will be set 
to value zero, meaning that fewer variables are selected for 
inclusion in the specification. Among the nonzero coef-
ficients, additional shrinkage is manifested.
3. Result and discussion
3.1. The incidence of under invoicing and black 
money
The percentage increase in corruption has been found to 
be directly associated with the level of under invoicing in 
the Pakistani economy. Moreover, the relationship is mani-
fested as a positively correlation. To examine its effect, this 
paper relies on the level of corruption reported in Trans-
parency’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), appearing 
in the World Economic Forum’s assessment, Transparency 
International and Amnesty International Report. The sta-
tistical data appearing in that Report is used as proxy for 
the level of corruption and black money in the market. We 
divide our sample into four quartiles, corresponding to the 
change in corruption. The paper’s findings are displayed 
on Table 5. The entries appearing on Table 5 are evidence 
of the positive systematic relationship between the index 
of corruption and the magnitude of under invoicing de-
picts that real estate market is under-invoiced property. 
When the annual change in black money was at the up-
per extreme i.e., more than 16% from previous year, the 
data show that transactions in the real estate market are 
under-invoiced on average by 39.4% (p < 0.05). Likewise, 
corruption increases by 8% in economy, under invoicing 
decreases to almost 15.51% which is significant at 99% 
confidence (p < 0.05). There is significant difference in all 
four quartiles (F value = 95.54, p < 0.05). The data strongly 
support the hypothesis that the level of under invoicing 
increases as the level of the corruption index increases. 
This finding is consistent with similar findings in the pa-
pers by (Cassara, 2016; Patnaik et al., 2012).
3.2. Under-invoicing and taxes
Previous studies suggested that taxes imposed on trans-
actions were positively correlated with the level of under 
invoicing (Ahmed Qureshi & Mahmood, 2016; Sandmo, 
2005). These studies argued that, generally, sellers under-
invoiced their assets to avoid the high level of taxation. 
This study examines the impact of overall taxes on level 
of under invoicing in real estate market. Table  6 below 
displays statistics showing the relationship between the 
incidence of under invoicing in the real estate market and 
tax rates imposed on transactions in the real estate market 
Table 5. Association between increases in corruption and the incidence of under invoicing (source: author’s calculation)
Corruption N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (ANOVA)
<= 8% increase in economy 101 15.515** 3.276 F value = 95.545**
>8% and <11% increase in economy 73 27.945** 15.305
>11% and <16% increase in economy 83 39.446** 11.418
>16% increase in economy 81 38.481** 12.131
Note: This table exhibits percentage in corruption from previous year and level of under invoicing of sample of 338 contracts of real estate. To test the 
significance, t-statistics is used. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1, and 5% respectively.
Table 6. Association between the aggregate tax rate and the incidence of under-invoicing (source: author’s calculation)
Overall volume of tax N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (ANOVA)
<= 9% increase in tax 90 29.322** 14.272 F value = 0.387
>9% and <11% increase in tax 86 31.000** 16.237
>11% and <13.75% increase in tax 77 28.597** 14.362
>13.75% increase in tax 85 29.306** 14.880
Note: This table exhibits the association between the levied tax and the incidence of under invoicing in a sample of 338 real estate contracts. The aggre-
gate tax liability consists of the Capital Gains Tax, the Capital Value Tax and the Stamp Duty and Withholding Tax. To test the significance, t-statistics 
levels are symbolized by *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1, and 5% respectively.
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of Pakistan. The data on Table 6 show that when tax rates 
were at the higher end of the range, i.e., more than 11%, 
transactions in the real estate market are under-invoiced 
an average of 31% (p < 0.05). At the other extreme, when 
the real estate taxis 9%, the incidence of under invoicing 
is about 29% (p < 0.05). There is no significant difference 
among the four quartiles (F value = 0.387, p > 0.05). This 
finding suggests that the rate of taxation has not signifi-
cant power to explain variation in under-invoicing.
3.3. Under-invoicing and rate of return on risk free 
investments
It is generally presumed that as the risk-free rate of re-
turn increases, ceteris paribus, the rate of savings will like-
wise increase. To the extent that savings increases, again 
ceteris paribus, one would expect to observe an increase 
in business investment activity, including activity in the 
real estate market as well as increase in business activities 
of overall economy (Ascherl & Schaefers, 2018; Brobert, 
2016). The increase in real estate transactions will tend 
over time to cause an increase in the prices of real prop-
erty. Those transaction price increases may be associated 
with an increase in under-invoicing. This study analyzes 
the systematic relationship between the risk-free rates of 
return and the incidence of under-invoicing.
The sample is partitioned into four sub-samples, based 
on the magnitude of the risk-free rate of return. Subsam-
ple (a) the risk-free rate of return is less than or equal to 
8%, (b) the risk-free rate of return is more than 8% and 
less than or equal to 9%, (c) the risk-free rate of return is 
more than 9% and less than or equal to 11%, and (d) the 
risk-free rate of return is more than 11%. The statistical 
findings are displayed on Table 7.
Table 7 reveals positive relationship between the risk-
free rate of return and the statistical incidence of under-
invoicing. For example, at the highest risk-free rate of re-
turn, (more than 11%), the statistical incidence of under 
invoicing is largest (38.57%, p < 0.05). There is a signifi-
cant difference among all four quartiles (F value = 35.70, 
p < 0.05). This finding suggests that the incidence of under 
invoicing tends to increase with increases in the risk-free 
rate of return.
3.4. Under-invoicing and widening gap
It is also generally observed that there is significant dif-
ference between “deputy commissioner (DC) rates” and 
market prices of the properties in the real estate market. 
Since DC rates are lower relative to the market value of 
1 yd2 (0.836 m2) in different housing authorities, most of 
the transactions in the real estate are based on DC rates. 
However, the actual transaction prices are recorded as per 
the market value. As a result of this discrepancy, unre-
corded cash flows pervade the real estate market.
In order to analyze the interplay between the widening 
gap and the incidence of under invoicing in the real estate 
market, we partition the data in our sample into four sub-
samples, defined by the size of the gap: (a) a gap less than or 
equal to 10824.5 PKRs, (b) a gap more than 10824.5 and less 
than 18479 PKRs, (c) a gap more than 18479 and less than 
27417.75 PKRs and (d) a gap exceeding 27417.75 PKRs.
The statistical evidence displayed on Table  8 shows 
that there is a significant positive correlation between 
the size of the Gap and the statistical incidence of under-
invoicing. There are significant differences among all four 
quartiles (F value = 114.58, p < 0.05). This statistical find-
ing supports the widening gap hypothesis. It appears that 
Table 7. Association between the rate of return on risk free investments and the incidence of under-invoicing  
(source: author’s calculation)
Rate of return on risk free investment N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (ANOVA)
<= 8% increase in economy 132 21.091** 12.366 F value = 35.70**
>8% and <9% increase in economy 41 28.878** 14.887
>9% and <11% increase in economy 82 34.488** 14.014
>11% increase in economy 83 38.578** 12.117
Note: Table 3 displays the systematic relationship between the of return on risk free investments and the statistical incidence of under invoicing in a 
sample of sample of 338 real estate contracts. To test the significance, the t-statistic is applied: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 
1, and 5% respectively.
Table 8. Association between the widening gap and incidence of under invoicing (source: author’s calculation)
Widening gap N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (ANOVA)
<= 10824.5 PKRs difference in market price and DC rates 105 15.482** 3.243 F value = 114.58**
>10824.5 and <18479 PKRs difference in market price and DC rates 64 23.238** 12.090
>18479 and <27417.75 PKRs difference in market price and DC rates 94 40.500** 12.262
>27417.75 PKRs difference in market price and DC rates 75 39.153** 11.702
Note: To test the significance, t-statistics is used. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1, and 5% respectively.
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magnitude of under invoicing increases with increase with 
the magnitude of the gap.
3.5. Under invoicing and reputation of housing 
authority
The reputation of the housing authority is considered an 
important determinant of under invoicing of real estate 
properties in Pakistan. It is thought that a small difference 
between market value of properties and value appearing 
on invoices is an indicator of the prestige of the housing 
authority. In this study, we define dichotomize the sample 
data to represent two classes of the prestige of the hous-
ing authority: high prestige and low prestige as measured 
in IPOs pricing performance (Arora & Singh, 2019). The 
dichotomized sample will help to explain how the prestige 
of the housing authority can affect the under invoicing. 
The literature of IPOs suggests a methodology for classi-
fying the reputation of underwriters. We test the effect of 
the reputation of the housing authority on the incidence 
of under invoicing in real estate market. In order to carry 
out the test, we defined the reputation of a local housing 
authority in Pakistan on the basis of the market share a 
specific authority regulates. If a real estate governmental 
institution regulates a market share above the median of 
overall market share of real estate market, it is assigned as 
1 (i.e., high reputation society), and 0 otherwise (Brounen 
et al., 2019; Wahid et al., 2019).
Table 9 displays statistical evidence suggesting that a 
“Higher Reputation” of a local housing authority is signifi-
cantly associated with a smaller statistical incidence of un-
der-invoicing. This finding suggests that the reputation of 
the housing authority affects the level of under invoicing 
in real estate market. It supports the signaling hypothesis 
that a higher market share of a specific housing authority 
can be construed as a signal that its recorded real estate 
values are reasonably accurate indicators of market values. 
That accuracy is a manifestation of the transparency of the 
recording procedure of that specific authority. That trans-
parency is important to investors and other stakeholders.
3.6. Under-invoicing and buyer’s employment status
According to Newberry and Collins (2017), employment 
status is significantly related to the decision of whether 
to sell or purchase assets. The authors inferred that em-
ployed persons are generally more alert than unemployed 
persons about relative prices and quality, as well as better 
informed about the transactional processes. In this paper, 
we examine the significance of the employment status of 
the buyer as a determinant of under-invoicing. The buyer’s 
employment status is defined as a binary dummy viable: if 
the buyer is employed it is assigned a value of 1; 0 other-
wise. Table 10 shows that the sub samples of buyers who 
are employed are associated with a smaller magnitude of 
under invoicing (26%, p < 0.01) relative to general public 
(38%, p < 0.01). There is a significant difference between 
under invoicing in transactions between those buyers who 
are employed, and those buyers not employed (t value = 
13.12, p < 0.01).
3.7. Under-invoicing and sector development
Sector economic development is thought to be a signifi-
cant factor contributing to an upward secular tends in real 
estate prices. Infrastructure development and increasing 
residential construction both affect the dynamic equilib-
rium of the residential housing market (Hromada, 2015). 
However, these two factors may move residential prices 
in unpredictable ways; An improvement in infrastructure 
(e.g., roads, bridges, electrification, water control, etc.) can 
be expected, ceteris paribus, to shift the demand curve for 
residential housing to the right. Whereas an increase in 
residential construction, ceteris paribus, can be expected 
to shift the supply curve for housing to the right. The net 
effect on prices is indeterminate. In this study, we examine 
only the effects of sector development on the statistical in-
cidence of under invoicing of properties in real estate mar-
ket. Table 11 displays the effects of three phases of sector 
development on the incidence of under-invoicing. The ta-
ble shows that the incidence of under invoicing in housing 
Table 9. Association between the reputation of the housing authority and the incidence of under invoicing  
(source: author’s calculation)
Reputation of housing authority N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (independent T-test )
Low reputation 170 39.147** 11.642 t value = 240.326**
High reputation 168 19.898** 11.176
Note: This table exhibits nexus reputation of housing authority and level of under invoicing of sample of 338 contracts of real estate. To test the signi-
ficance, t-statistics is used. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1, and 5% respectively.
Table 10. Association between the Buyer’s employment status and the incidence under invoicing (source: author’s calculation)
Buyer’s employment status N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (independent T-test )
General public 80 38.288** 0.1318 t value = 13.127**
Employed person 258 26.880** 0.1441
Note: This table exhibits association between nexus buyer’s employment status and statistical incidence of under invoicing of sample of 338 contracts 
of real estate. To test the significance, t-statistics is used. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1, and 5% respectively.
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sectors in the developing and in transition phases is sig-
nificantly larger (32% and 35% respectively, p < 0.01) as 
compared to developed housing authority (26%, p < 0.01). 
There is also a significant difference between the under 
invoicing in developing, in transition and developed hous-
ing authority (F value = 114.58, p < 0.01).
3.8. Under invoicing and market sentiment
Previous studies carried out in capital and financial mar-
kets suggest that market sentiment plays a vital role in 
causing price volatility (Badru & Ahmad-Zaluki, 2018; 
Rathnayake et al., 2019). Generally, one can identify two 
sentiments i.e. an optimistic sentiment that will tend to 
push up the general level of prices (hot market) and a pes-
simistic view that will tend to depress the general level of 
prices (cold market).
In this paper, market sentiment is defined as a binary 
variable; it is assigned a value of 1 for a hot market and 0 
for a cold market. If the number of property transactions 
is higher than the average volume, is assigned a 1, 0 oth-
erwise. In this study, we test whether there is a systematic 
relationship between market sentiment and the incidence 
of under invoicing in real estate market. The statistical evi-
dence displayed on Table 12 shows that in a hot the real 
estate market, under invoicing in properties is more sig-
nificant than in a cold market (t value = 10.58, p < 0.01).
3.9. Result of basic model with all Z-variables
Table 13 reports the result when all the Z-variables are 
included. These variables include: Stamp duty, withhold-
ing tax, capital gain tax, sector development, transfer fee, 
and market sentiment are the significant variables in the 
OLS model-I from the Z-variables. The coefficient of 
capital gain tax is significantly and positively associated 
with under invoicing (b = 2.005, p < 0.01). This finding 
has policy implication: to wit, an increase in the capital 
gains tax, ceteris paribus, will tend to be associated with 
a greater incidence of under-invoicing. The coefficient 
of corruption level or black money in economy is also 
positively correlated with under invoicing (b = 0.476, 
p < 0.01). Similarly, the coefficient of rate of risk-free 
investment is positively correlated with under invoicing 
(b = 0.589, p < 0.05). This evidence suggests that under 
invoicing increases due to an increase in the risk-free 
return. The coefficient of buyer’s employment status is 
significantly positive correlated with the level of under 
invoicing (b = 0.025, p < 0.05).
This finding suggests that if the number of employed 
buyers increases, the statistical incidence of under invoic-
ing will tend to increase. The reputation of the housing 
authority plays a significant role in level of under invoic-
ing. The beta coefficient of reputation of housing authority 
is negatively correlated with under invoicing (b = –0.058, 
p < 0.01). That finding suggests that a high prestige hous-
ing authority is associated with less under invoicing in 
properties and assets of real estate market. The evidence 
also suggests that the widening gap is significantly associ-
ated with under-invoicing of real estate market. The co-
efficient of reputation of housing authority is negatively 
correlated with under invoicing (b = 0.231, p < 0.01). This 
finding can be interpreted to mean that as the gap between 
the DC rates and transaction values of assets in real estate 
market increases, the incidence of under-invoicing will 
tend to increase.
3.10. Result of extreme bounds analysis
In an EBA analysis the buyer’s employment status emerged 
as robust determinants of under invoicing in real estate 
market. Sensitivity analysis tests whether X- and Q-varia-
bles are robust or fragile? Out of twelve, three Z-variables 
are selected in each regression – 126 combinations by us-
ing n!/(k!(n – k)! in total, are tested. Under this technique, 
the variable shows VIF 10, confidence level 0.95, and CI 
0.95 are only selected. Table  13 and EBA and LASSO 
present results of the sensitivity test. The results indicate 
that (a) capital value tax, (b) corruption level in market, 
(c) buyer’s profession, (d) reputation of housing scheme 
Table 11. Association between Sector Development and the incidence of under-invoicing (source: author’s calculation)
Sector development N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (ANOVA)
Transition phase 69 35.464** 15.171 F value = 114.58**
Developed sector 215 26.898** 14.300
Developing sector 54 32.741** 14.527
Note: This table displays the statistical association between sector development and the incidence of under invoicing in a sample of sample 338 real 
estate contracts. To test the significance, t-statistics is used. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1, and 5% respectively.
Table 12. Association between real estate market sentiment and the incidence of under invoicing (source: author’s calculation)
Real estate market sentiment N Mean Std. Deviation Difference between groups (independent T-test )
Cold market 97 25.474** 14.780 t value = 10.587**
Hot market 241 31.232** 14.693
Note: This table displays the association between market sentiments and the incidence of under invoicing of sample of 338 contracts of real estate. To 
test the significance, t-statistics is used. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1, and 5% respectively.
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and (e) widening gap are the robust variables in deter-
mining under invoicing while the rest of the variables are 
fragile in the analysis as indicated in equation.
To measure the sensitivity and the robustness of the 
factors affecting under-invoicing in real estate, we com-
pare the results of EBA and LASSO technique with tra-
ditional methods which include the Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC), the Schwarz’s Bayesian information cri-
terion (SBIC) and the Hannan-Quinn information cri-
terion (HQIC) as shown in Table  13 and Post-OLS. We 
select the lower values of information criteria and derive 
fewer variables. The application of the EBA and LASSO 
techniques find that the model specification is limited to 
capital value tax, corruption level in market, buyer’s pro-
fession, reputation of housing scheme and widening gap. 
Alternatively, traditional techniques (e.g., AIC, SBIC and 
HQIC) recommend capital value tax, corruption level in 
market, buyer’s profession, reputation of housing scheme 
and widening gap selected on the basis of lower value of 
information criteria.
Table 13. Least squares estimates of parameters (source: author’s calculation)
Pre-OLS EBA LASSO Post-OLS
Capital value tax 2.005 3.737 3.215 2.937
(2.82)** (3.45)** (4.33)** (3.21)**
Stamp duty –2.254
(1.95)
Corruption level 0.476 0.758 0.646 0.318
(2.22)* (4.27)** (3.97)** (3.62)**
Withholding tax –0.122
(0.21)
Capital gain tax 0.068
(0.30)
Rate of risk-free return 0.589
(1.97)*
Buyer’s profession 0.025 0.050 0.102 0.011
(2.45)* (2.93)** (3.53)** (2.98)**










_cons 0.151 0.141 0.135 0.159
(2.31)* (3.57)** (2.56)** (2.32)*




N 338 338 338 338
Note: This table exhibits determinants of under invoicing of sample of 338 contracts of real estate. In first OLS was applied to find out potential determi-
nants of under invoicing in real estate sector of Pakistan. In second step, we applied extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to find out the robust determinant 
out of set of potential determinants. In EBA, total of 126 combinations of using n!/(k!(n – k)! formula of 4 regressors (4 level combination of variables 
of interest) from the Z(n × 13) vector were used. Detail of model is VIF 10, confidence level 0.95., and CI 0.95. The table also depicts the comparison 
of estimation results between traditional methods derived from the OLS and EBA technique on 36th months of trading periods. AIC = Akaike’s In-
formation Criterion, SBIC = Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion, HQIC = Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion, and EBA = Extreme Bounds 
Analysis. Traditional methods are specified on the basis of permutations (126 regressions) and the best combination is selected on the basis of their 
smaller values of AIC, SBIC, and HQIC. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 represent significance level at the 1%, and 5% respectively.
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Conclusions
The objective of this study is to examine the magnitude of 
under-invoicing in the real estate market in Pakistan and 
identify the factors that cause it. Our statistical sample 
consisted of 338 real property sale agreements. Our find-
ings support (a) tax evasion hypothesis, (b) widening gap 
hypothesis, (c) corruption hypothesis and (d) signaling hy-
pothesis. In Pakistan, there are various categories of tax in 
real estate properties e.g., Capital Gains Tax (CGT), Capital 
Value Tax (CVT), Stamp Duty and Withholding Tax or Ad-
vance Tax. In summary, the aggregate level of real state tax 
liability is almost 15–25% of recorded value that are levied 
in real estate market. Withholding tax is to be paid by the 
buyer and Capital Gains Tax is to be paid by the seller. We 
find that higher rates of taxation in the real estate market 
are strongly positively correlated with under-invoicing in 
that market. When executing a transaction real property, 
have a strong incentive to record an undervaluation of the 
transaction price in order to avoid the tax. A consequence 
of this kind of tax-avoidance behavior implies that as real 
estate tax rates increase, the statistical incidence of under 
invoicing in the real estate market increases.
A second finding of this study is that increases in cor-
ruption in the real estate market in Pakistan are system-
atically associated with higher levels of under invoicing 
in the market. In Pakistan, the documented rate of cor-
ruption and black money increases by 5% to 10% every 
year. Under invoicing is used to conceal the magnitude 
of corruption. A major finding in this paper is that there 
is a large gap between “deputy commissioner (DC) rates” 
and market prices of the counterpart properties. This gap 
encourages the circulation of undocumented funds in the 
market. The immediate consequence of the undocument-
ed funds is manifested as tax evasion.
Many housing markets in Pakistan are located in high 
prestige housing society regions e.g., house prices of De-
fense Housing Authority (DHA) and Bahria Town are ex-
periencing rising prices. However, housing prices of low 
prestige housing societies operating in the same geographic 
region may experience falling prices. Desirable areas lo-
cated in low prestige housing societies can resist market 
trends because the demand curve is shifting to the right 
and the supply of good quality housing is inelastic in the 
short run. After reforms in the real estate market enacted 
the incumbent governmental authorities, the term “real 
estate” has become almost synonymous with the word “in-
vestment.” The majority of the investors are allocating their 
savings to the real estate sector, which leads to a higher de-
mand for housing. As a result, prices of residential as well 
as commercial properties are rising rapidly in Pakistan. 
That upward trend in prices is manifested as an incentive 
for real estate investors to practice under-invoicing.
The findings of this study suggest that investors and 
residential owners of real estate must be mindful of the 
reforms imposed by the incumbent government. Those 
reforms are manifested as volatile taxes imposed on 
real estate and subsidies provided by the government to 
this sector. The empirical findings of this study may be 
of interest to regulatory bodies and housing societies. 
Our findings suggest how administrative authorities can 
improve the efficiency of transactions in the real estate 
market by addressing causes of under invoicing. Focused 
policies would help to mitigate the statistical incidence of 
under-invoicing of real estate properties and thereby me-
liorate (but probably not eliminate) tax evasion.
In this study we used only observable factors thought 
to have a statistically significant relation to the valuation of 
residential real estate in Pakistan. Building on these find-
ings, we propose that future research may be addressed 
to external factor that might influence the incidence of 
under-invoicing of housing properties. Examples of such 
factors are the status of law enforcement in a region, fi-
nancing provided for and by known terrorist organiza-
tions and transactions in undocumented real estate.
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